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Abstract
We study approval rules in a model where horizontal merger proposals arise endogenously
as the outcome of negotiations among the rms in the industry. We make two main points.
First, relatively ine¢ cient merger proposals succeed with positive probability. That is, the
negotiation process may result in a particular merger agreement despite the existence of an
alternative one that would generate higher prots and higher consumer surplus. Second, the
antitrust authority should optimally commit to an approval rule that is more stringent for
all mergers than the optimal ex-post rule.
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1 Introduction
A horizontal merger may increase market power and hence reduce welfare. But a merger may also
create social value if it generates cost savings. One important task for competition authorities
is to examine merger proposals and evaluate the balance between these two e¤ects. Approval
decisions are typically viewed as discretionary: authorities consider each merger proposal in
isolation and approve it only if it improves social welfare. That is, if costs savings outweigh
enhanced market power. However, a growing literature has studied the potential advantages of
rules over discretion. This literature has discussed how information asymmetries and dynamic
considerations may justify the use of rules.1 Additionally, Armstrong and Vickers (2010) and
Nocke and Whinston (2013) have argued that an ex-ante rule may improve the selection of
merger proposals. We take the latter approach. As Armstrong and Vickers (2010) point out,
authorities are in the position of a principal dealing with an agent that chooses a project from
a feasible set that only the agent can observe. The principal can inuence the behavior of the
agent, not through monetary rewards, but by "specifying what the agent is and is not allowed
to do". Armstrong and Vickers (2010), and subsequently Nocke and Whinston (2013) in more
detail, have discussed the optimal merger policy when the authority faces a conict of interest
with one rm (the acquirer) that can choose between di¤erent merger partners. The conict
of interest arises from a possible misalignment between the protability of these alternative
mergers and their e¤ect on consumer surplus (or on a weighted average of prots and consumer
surplus). They show that a discretionary policy that approves all consumer surplus enhancing
mergers is not ex-ante optimal. A more stringent policy for mergers that involve larger rms
can improve the selection of merger proposals, by discriminating against mergers that generate
higher prots but lower consumer surplus.
In this paper we begin by sidestepping the conict of interest between authorities and the
industry, and focus instead on a problem that arises when the principal deals with multiple
agents: bargaining failures. A merger proposal is often the result of negotiations involving
several rms with conicting interests. Even if, as a whole, the interests of the "industry",
aggregate prots, move parallel to those of the authority, negotiations among alternative merging
partners do not necessarily result in the maximization of total industry prots. We make two
main points. First, relatively ine¢ cient merger proposals succeed with positive probability.
If no rm is exogenously designated an essential member of all feasible mergers, and since
side payments between merging and not merging rms are not possible, then the negotiation
1See Bensako and Spulber (1993) and Nocke and Whinston (2010).
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process will sometimes select a merger agreement despite the existence of an alternative one that
would generate higher aggregate prots and higher consumer surplus. Second, because of these
bargaining failures, the antitrust authority should optimally commit to an approval rule that is
more stringent than the optimal discretionary policy for all mergers. The optimal rule balances
the benets (a more stringent rule reduces the probability that the best merger is beaten out by
a less desirable option) with the costs (some merger proposals that generate positive, but small,
gains in consumer surplus will be blocked.)
We study an abstract model that encompasses several standard oligopoly models, includ-
ing Cournot competition with homogeneous products and Dixits (1979) oligopoly model with
di¤erentiated products and linear demand. In the benchmark model, any pair among three
ex-ante symmetric rms may agree to merge and realize cost e¢ ciencies that vary across pairs.
Hence, the resulting surplus will depend on the identity of the merging rms. Ex-ante symmetry
guarantees that the most protable merger is also the one that achieves the highest consumer
surplus. Thus, we abstract from any conict of interest between antitrust authorities and the
"industry", so that the e¤ects of the bargaining process are more transparent. We envision the
negotiations that lead to the submission of a merger proposal as a exible process in which each
rm may bargain bilaterally and simultaneously with any other rm. In order to formalize these
ideas we assume that rms use a specic non-cooperative bargaining protocol that, in contrast to
most protocols used in this literature, does not place any articial restriction on the endogenous
likelihood of di¤erent mergers. The bargaining protocol always generates a unique prediction,
and if the relative synergies of di¤erent mergers are not su¢ ciently di¤erent then the outcome
of the bargaining process is sometimes ine¢ cient from the industrys point of view.
As discussed in Section 5, bargaining failures have been neglected by the literature on en-
dogenous mergers and merger policy, but not by the more abstract theory of coalition formation.
Indeed, the predictions of our protocol concerning the possibility of ine¢ cient outcomes are per-
fectly in line with this literature. The merit of our protocol is to generate clean predictions
(unique equilibrium) and an intuitive characterization of bargaining failures. In particular, in-
e¢ cient outcomes are predicted if and only if the core of the underlying cooperative game is
empty. Hence, the main qualitative results of the paper are not an artifact of a specic protocol
and would also be obtained if we used instead a more standard protocol.2
The connection between the emptiness of the core and a positive probability of an ine¢ cient
outcome is not accidental. When the core is empty there is no single bilateral agreement that is
2Our protocol asymptotically implements a new solution concept for cooperative games that we have developed
elsewhere (Burguet and Caminal, 2011)
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immune to a countero¤er by the rm left out of the deal. In other words, if the prediction were
that one of the mergers occurs with probability one, then the left out rm would gain by o¤ering
a better deal to one of the merging partners. Instead, for these cases, in our game all three rms
have a positive probability of being part of the successful merger in equilibrium, and each rm
is actually indi¤erent about its merging partner. But then the best merger will not happen with
probability one. A more stringent merger policy may restore the non-emptiness of the core by
prohibiting mergers that result in modest welfare gains, but that are able to challenge more
socially desirable mergers.
Our paper is closely related to three di¤erent strands of the literature: endogenous merg-
ers, optimal merger approval rules, and non-cooperative bargaining. Many studies have focused
on how mergers are endogenously determined. This literature typically ignores merger control.
Some authors (Barros, 1998; and Horn and Persson, 2001) have approached the problem us-
ing cooperative solution concepts for games in partition function form, since a merger creates
externalities on non-merging rms. Other authors (Kamien and Zang, 1990; Gowrisankaran,
1999; Inderst and Wey, 2004; Fridol¤son and Stennek, 2005a; Qiu and Zhou, 2007; and Nocke
and Whinston, 2013) have set up non-cooperative games where both the market structure and
the division of surplus are determined simultaneously. Some of these models set restrictions on
the subsets of rms that can participate in a merger. For example, Inderst and Wey (2004)
assume that there is an exogenously designated target and in Nocke and Whinston (2013) it is
the acquirer who is determined exogenously. In a similar spirit, Gowrisankaran (1999) assumes
that the largest rm is the only one that can acquire a smaller rm. Qiu and Zhou (2007) pro-
pose a more exible bargaining protocol but nature still plays a decisive role. In fact, when all
potential mergers are protable and attractive their protocol predicts that the outcome would
be determined by natures exogenous choice. Hence, these studies do not contemplate the possi-
bility that each member of, say, a three-rm group considers merging with each of the other two,
which, as we discussed above, is a crucial ingredient in the emergence of bargaining failures.3
In other studies, these restrictions on the feasible merger combinations are not imposed, but all
mergers are assumed symmetric, so that bargaining failures are impossible (Kamien and Zang,
3 In some real world cases a particular rm (perhaps, in nancial distress) may appear as the natural target.
This was the case, for instance, in the Nestlé-Perrier case following the benzene scandal, where Nestlé and the
Agnellis group competed to acquire the troubled French company. In other situations the industry may require
an increase in concentration, but a priori all possible subsets could sensibly attempt a cost-reducing merger. A
recent example is the US airlines industry. Before announcing their merger with Continental in 2010, United had
been reported negotiating with US Airways. Moreover, the press speculated about almost all possible bilateral
mergers involving these three rms plus American.
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1990; and Fridol¤son and Stennek, 2005a).4
The literature on optimal merger approval rules can be traced back to Besanko and Spulber
(1993). We have already commented the work by Armstrong and Vickers (2010) on delegated
project choice. Nocke and Whinston (2013) apply their ideas to merger control in a Cournot
model with endogenous determination of merger proposals. They show that the optimal ex-ante
rule is more stringent for mergers that cause a larger change in the (naively computed) Herndahl
index. We borrow from them the specication of the merger review process.5 As discussed above,
we place the focus on the negotiations among rms when none of them is exogenously designated
to be an essential member of any feasible merger. In Section 3 we discuss the consequences of
ex-ante asymmetries. Asymmetries exacerbate the expected consumer surplus losses associated
to the bargaining process, as compared to a rst best where the merger that maximizes consumer
surplus was always implemented. Numerical simulations indicate that the e¤ectiveness of the
ex-ante optimal rule increases with asymmetries. This optimal ex-ante policy is more stringent
for all possible mergers, but much more so for mergers that involve a higher increase in the
(naively computed) Herndhal index. Hence, the insights of Nocke and Whinston (2013) and
our benchmark model are complementary. However, under asymmetry the interaction between
the conict of interest and the bargaining failure is characterized by some subtleties. Indeed,
as in the symmetric case, when asymmetries are moderate private bargaining failures (that is,
rmsfailure to maximize industry prots) add to the losses provoked by the conict of interest
discussed in Nocke and Whinston (2013). However, for large asymmetries, private bargaining
failures actually attenuate the e¤ects of the conict of interest. That is, our bargaining protocol
predicts in this case the success of the e¢ cient merger more often than in case merger selection
failures were exclusively originated in the conict of interest. As a result, the optimal approval
rule for mergers involving larger rms is less stringent than in such case.
The merger problem we take up in this paper is similar (and equivalent, for some parameter
values) to what has been termed the three-person/three-cake problem (see, for instance, Bin-
more, 1985), or in general a (restricted) game of coalition formation. Non cooperative analyses
of this sort of problems abound, and most use one version or another of a dynamic proponent-
respondent game in the Rubinstein-Stahl tradition. (See Ray, 2007, for a general discussion
including games with externalities, and Compte and Jehiel, 2010, for a recent example.) As we
4Kamien and Zang (1990) assume that each rm simultaneously sets an asking price and bids for each of the
other rms. Much closer to our modeling approach, Fridol¤son and Stennek (2005a) set up a dynamic bargaining
game, which will be discussed below.
5Our discussion of dynamic merger policy (Section 4) is also related to Motta and Vasconcelos (2005), Qiu
and Zhou (2007), and Nocke and Whinston (2010).
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have already mentioned, we use a less standard game where the ordering of proposers is endoge-
nous. That is, the agreed outcome is not a consequence of any arbitrary order of proposals: on
the contrary, both order and outcome, are jointly determined by the primitives of the bargaining
problem.6
The benchmark model describes the implications of alternative market structures using
reduced-forms. Both the model and the main results are presented in Section 2. In Section
3 we maintain the assumption of three initial rms but allow for ex-ante asymmetries and in
Section 4 we discuss sequential mergers by considering an industry with four initial rms. In
both cases we show that bargaining failures are compounded with the conict of interest between
authorities and the industry. In Section 5 we discuss the robustness of the results to changes in
the bargaining protocol. Finally, Section 6 contains a brief summary and comments on several
additional issues.
2 The benchmark model
We consider an industry where rms compete in the market but also bargain about the possibility
of submitting a merger proposal. We embed bargaining and competition in a dynamic but
stationary setting. First, merger opportunities, i.e., potential synergies, do not evolve with
time. Second, we restrict ourselves to "stationary" equilibria, so that rmsstrategies do not
depend on history. That is, rms play the one-shot equilibrium strategies in the market stage,
and ignore past moves in the bargaining stage.
Time is a discrete variable indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; ::: (innite horizon). At the beginning of
the game there are three identical rms: 1; 2; 3. The following sequence of moves takes place in
t = 0:
a) Competition authorities announce a rule for approving mergers that will remain xed
forever (full commitment).
b) All rms, but not authorities, learn the synergies that would result from each merger.
In other words, the marginal cost for the rm resulting from a merger between rms i and j,
denoted by cij , for all (i; j), i; j = 1; 2; 3; i 6= j, becomes rmscommon knowledge.
c) The three rms bargain about the possible submission of a merger proposal. They ne-
gotiate bilaterally within a protocol specied below. If two rms agree on submitting a merger
proposal, authorities will learn the cost of the merged rm, and approve the merger if and only
6We must agree with Ray in that "a theory that purports to yield solutions that are independent of proposer
ordering is suspect." The key for our unique prediction is that our theory includes an endogenous determination
of this "order of proponents".
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if it complies with the announced rule.
d) If no merger has been authorized then the triopoly game is played in the market; otherwise,
the duopoly game is played where the merged rm competes with the stand alone rm.
In each later period t, t > 0, if a merger was successful in the past then the existing rms
keep playing the duopoly game. If no merger proposal was ever submitted, the game follows c)
and d) above. That is, again rms engage in bargaining followed by competition.
Authorities are assumed to maximize the expected present value of consumer surplus, as it
appears to be the case in the real world. Both rms and competition authorities discount the
future at the rate r. We will focus on the case that r is arbitrarily small, so that the friction
built in the bargaining protocol is also arbitrarily small.
2.1 Static competition in a nutshell
The e¤ect of synergies on the distribution of prots and consumer surplus will be represented
by exogenous functions. The three initial rms have access to the same constant returns to scale
technology and hence face the same marginal cost c0. The equilibrium level of prots of a single
rm under triopoly is denoted by 0, and the level of consumer surplus by CS0.
Only two-rm mergers generate synergies, which can be di¤erent for di¤erent pairs, and as
a result authorities will never allow a merger to monopoly.7 As a notational convention, rms
1 and 2 are the partners to the most e¢ cient and protable merger. Of course, in making
this convention, we must assume that the identity of the rms is common knowledge for rms,
but unknown to authorities. For simplicity, we also assume that the other two mergers are
symmetric; i.e., c13 = c23  c12. We thus assume that from the authorities point of view
(c12; c13) are random variables distributed according to some density function h (c12; c13) that
has no mass points and takes strictly positive values on C  f(c12; c13) j 0  c12  c13  c0g,
but h (c12; c13) = 0, if (c12; c13) =2 C. Also for simplicity, we restrict attention to the case
that approval rules take the form of a threshold value, c. Thus, at the beginning of the game
authorities announce a cut-o¤, c, and commit to approve a merger proposal if and only if the
marginal cost of the merged rm is lower than c.8
Let us now consider the duopoly game. Suppose a merger between rms i and j, with
marginal cost cij , has been approved. Then the merged rm faces a stand alone rm, k, k 6= i; j;
with marginal cost c0. Per period prots of the merged and stand alone rms are denoted by
ij (cij) and k (cij), respectively. Consumer surplus is denoted by CS (cij). In the appendix,
7Unless otherwise specied we assume that implementing a merger involves no cost.
8Nocke and Whinston (2013) discuss in detail the optimality of cuto¤ policies in a related setup.
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the following assumptions are derived from rst principles for some models of competition:
(A.1) There exists a value of the marginal cost of the merged rm, cn, 0 < cn < c0; such
that CS (cn) = CS0. Moreover, CS (cij) is a continuously di¤erentiable function with dCSdcij < 0.
Hence, a merger increases consumer surplus if and only if cij  cn.
(A.2) ij (cij) is continuously di¤erentiable with
dij
dcij
< 0. Moreover, ij (cn) > 20. Hence,
any merger that is socially desirable is also protable for the merging rms.
(A.3) k (cij) is continuously di¤erentiable with
dk
dcij
> 0. Moreover, k (cn) = 0. Hence,
any merger that is socially desirable is detrimental to the stand alone rm.
In imposing (A.3) we implicitly assume that for all cij > 0 the stand alone rm, k, remains
active. In the models discussed at the end of this subsection, there may exist cM > 0 such that
k (cM ) = 0. In other words, the stand alone rm leaves the market if cij  cM and then the
merged rm becomes a monopolist. To simplify the presentation we will ignore this possibility.
Since we focus for the moment on the case c  cn, assumptions (A.1) through (A.3) imply
that a feasible merger is not only protable but also attractive: all mergers that would be
authorized result in prots for the merged rm that exceed the joint prots in the status quo.
Moreover, all rms prefer to be part of a merger rather than be left out.
For a given realization of (c12; c13), 12, 3 denote the distribution of prots when the e¢ cient
merger takes place, and 13 (= 23), 2 (= 1) when one of the less e¢ cient merger materializes.
Thus, these four numbers, 12; 13; 2; 3; are the crucial parameters of the bargaining game.
Assumptions (A.2) and (A.3) imply that if cij  cn then 1212  1213 > 0  2  3.
Finally we assume:
(A.4) For all cij  cn; dijdcij (cij) > 2
dk
dcij
(cij)
This assumption will contribute to pin down the comparative statics of the bargaining out-
come, but is not crucial for the main result on the predicted merger and on merger rules.
It is important to notice that (A.4) implies that, if all mergers enhance consumer surplus,
c12  c13  cn, then aggregate prots under the e¢ cient merger are higher than under a less
e¢ cient one: 12 + 3  13 + 2. The reason is that starting at c12 = c13, any reduction in
c12 increases 12 more than what it reduces 3. Hence, under (A.4) private and social goals are
aligned as far as the ranking of mergers is concerned. This simply claries the nature of the
bargaining failures.
In some of the most standard models for oligopoly, the equilibrium prots and consumer
surplus satisfy these assumptions. That is, our model captures in reduced form those models.
As we show in the appendix, these include the Cournot model when the inverse demand function
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p(Q) is strictly decreasing and satises p0 (Q)Q + p" (Q) < 0.9 Di¤erentiated-goods models in
the spirit of Dixit (1979) also result in prot and consumer surplus that satisfy (A.1) through
(A.4). For instance, assume that the representative consumers utility function is quadratic in
the varieties produced by three rms, i = 1; 2; 3, and additively separable in the numeraire good,
x,
U(q; x) = x+ 
3X
i=1
qi   
2
3X
i=1
q2i  

2
3X
i=1
Y
j 6=i
qiqj ; (1)
where  > 0;  >  > 0, qi represents the quantities of variety i consumed, and q = (q1; q2; q3).
We show in the appendix that prots and consumer surplus satisfy (A.1) through (A.4), inde-
pendently of whether rms compete in prices or quantities, as long as the products are not too
close substitutes.
2.2 The bargaining game
We model the negotiation between rms leading to a merger proposal as a bargaining protocol
that is more exible, in a sense that will be specied below, than most protocols used in the
literature. In Section 5 we will argue that the main qualitative results about merger policy would
also hold if we used instead a more standard protocol. However, these other protocols fail to
o¤er clear predictions (multiplicity of equilibria) and tend to distort the distribution of surplus
in favor of the weaker player, causing non intuitive comparative statics and discontinuities of
the outcomes.
We model rmsnegotiations as a game that is repeated in each period until an agreement
is reached. There are two elements to any agreement: the identity of the merging rms, and
the division of surplus resulting from the merger. Thus, in each period the protocol rst allows
rms to endogenously select the negotiating partners, and then allows those partners to discuss
the realization of the merger and the division of the corresponding surplus. The rst part of the
protocol is as follows:
Selection of negotiating partners
(1) Nature selects one of the three rms, each with probability 13 . Let that rm be A.
(2) Firm A invites one of the other two rms to become its negotiation partner. Let that
rm be B.
(3) Firm B accepts or rejects the invitation. If it accepts, then rms (A;B) enter into the
negotiation stage. Otherwise, rms (B;C) enter into the negotiation stage.
9Some additional conditions are necessary for cn > 0, which is part of assumption (A.1), both in the Cournot
model and in the di¤erentiated product model. If these restrictions are violated then the probability that a merger
is able to increase consumer surplus is zero, and so the problem is not interesting.
9
The second part, i.e., the negotiations between either (A;B) or (B;C) (let (F;E) represent
in general that pair of rms), could be modeled in a variety of equivalent ways and we choose
the simplest.
Actual negotiation between F and E.
(4) Nature selects one of the two rms, each with probability 12 . Let that rm be F .
(5) Firm F makes an o¤er to rm E: EF , understood as the per-period prots that E retains
if merged with F .
(6) Firm E accepts or rejects Fs o¤er. If E accepts then it gets EF per period, that is,
1+r
r 
E
F discounted total payo¤; rm F gets FE   EF , that is,
 
FE   EF

1+r
r discounted total
payo¤; and the bargaining ends. If E rejects the o¤er then all rms obtain in that period the
equilibrium prots of the triopoly game, and bargaining is resumed in the next period.
Steps (1) to (6) describe the timing of the perfect-information, stage game played in each
period until an agreement is reached. The protocols most novel feature is step (3) and it is this
feature what makes our protocol su¢ ciently exible.10 By introducing it, natures choice in step
(1) does not impose upper or lower bounds on the probability that any given rm is part of a
successful merger in any given period. We discuss the consequences of alternative specications
of the bargaining protocol in Section 5.
We focus on Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE) outcomes when bargaining frictions are
negligible.11 Thus, we will state results for the limit of equilibria as r ! 0. A stationary
strategy for a rm includes a probability distribution over the two potential invitees when the
rm becomes rm A in step (2), and a probability distribution over the two potential answers
in step (3), if the rm is invited in step (2). Also, a strategy includes an o¤er to be made to
each potential partner in step (5) if the rm becomes rm F in step (4), and an answer to every
possible o¤er received from either of the two possible partners if it becomes rm E in step (5).
For simplicity and keeping with the stationarity assumption, we will only consider equilibria
where Bs choice of partner for steps (4) to (6) does not depend on who played the role of A,
10Note that we could have added a trivial possibility in (3): that rm C rejects being part of the negotiations
with B, and then the game moves to the next period without agreement. Without adding this possibility, rm
C can always reject any o¤er in (6) if it becomes rm E, and make an o¤er that will be rejected for sure, if
it is rm E. Thus any equilibrium outcome in the extended game where that option is played with positive
probability would be also an equilibrium outcome of our game. We can also argue that nothing would change
by adding yet another possibility, that rm C rejects rm Bs invitation and instead invites rm A. The key is
that: 1) any (equilibrium) probability distribution over the three possible pairs in the extended protocol can be
obtained with (mixed) strategies in the protocol proposed here; and, 2) with the same continuation strategies for
the negotiations stage, those strategies would also be equilibria in our protocol.
11As we let r ! 0 both bargaining rounds and market decisions become more frequent. Like most of the
bargaining literature, we wish to focus on the limiting case where bargaining rounds are arbitrarily close in order
to avoid introducing articial rigidities. Linking the timing of bargaining moves and market decisions facilitates
the analysis considerably by preserving the stationarity of the game.
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and o¤ers and answers in (5) and (6) depend on the identity of E and F , but not on who played
the role of A and B.
In the trivial case that c < c12  c13 no merger would pass the requirements of the authorities,
and hence there is no room for negotiations. Almost as trivial is the case c12  c < c13, where
only one merger is feasible. In the unique equilibrium for that case, the e¢ cient merger is
agreed in period 0 and rms 1 and 2 obtain an expected, per period payo¤ 12(c12)2 , whereas rm
3 obtains 3 (c12).
The most interesting case is c12  c13  c, where three mergers are feasible. For the moment,
let us focus on the case c  cn. Since all acceptable mergers are protable and attractive, a merger
is bound to occur immediately with probability one. However, there is still a question as to the
identity of the rms involved. The following proposition characterizes the unique equilibrium
outcome.
Proposition 1 Suppose that all three mergers are feasible. Then, for r su¢ ciently small, there
exists a unique MPE outcome, both in payo¤s and probability distribution over mergers. A
merger always occurs with probability 1 in the rst period. (i) If
 
1
2 + r

12 (1 + r)13+3  0
then the e¢ cient merger between rms 1 and 2 occurs with probability one, (ii) if
 
1
2 + r

12  
(1 + r)13 + 3 < 0 then all three potential mergers take place with positive probability. In
particular, the probability of the e¢ cient merger is:
d =
12   22 + 4r (12   13)
 12 + 413   22   43 : (2)
Proof. See Appendix.
The uniqueness result indicates that our bargaining protocol o¤ers sharp predictions. Even
more important, these predictions include the possibility of ine¢ cient outcomes. Although the
formal proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix, it is helpful to present its heuristics
here. Consider a very low value of r, so that we can virtually set r = 0. Notice that, in this
case, the unique equilibrium identied in the proposition is e¢ cient if and only if the core of the
cooperative game is not empty. Indeed, the condition
1
2
12   13 + 3  0 (3)
is necessary and su¢ cient for the core not to be empty and is also necessary and su¢ cient for the
merger between rms 1 and 2 to occur with probability one. Let ui be the per period, ex-ante
(before Nature moves), equilibrium utility for rm i. When (3) is satised, u1 = u2 = 1212 and
u3 = 3. Firms 1 and 2 always invite each other to negotiate and the existence of alternative
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feasible mergers is irrelevant (outside option principle): any o¤er that rm 3 may accept or any
request that it would make, i.e., above 3, would leave at most 13   3 < 1212 for rm 1
or 2, and hence these rms have no incentives to deviate. However, when mergers are not too
heterogeneous, and condition (3) fails, a pure strategy equilibrium where rms 1 and 2 always
merge is impossible. Indeed, if d = 1 the alternative to any deal today would be again a merger
between rms 1 and 2 tomorrow, and so we would still have u1 = u2 = 1212 and u3 = 3. But
then, when invited to negotiate, rm 1 (or, equivalently, rm 2) would prefer to negotiate with
rm 3, which rm 3 would accept. Indeed, in the actual negotiation, rm 1 could o¤er 31 = 3 if
it is the proposer, an o¤er that would be accepted. (Of course, rm 3 would o¤er an acceptable
o¤er 13 =
1
212, which leaves a payo¤ of 13   1212 > 3). This renders the deviation of rm 1
(or rm 2) protable. Hence, in this region an equilibrium with d = 1 does not exist.
The question is then, what could be an equilibrium when the core is empty? This is what
part (ii) of the proposition answers. From our discussion above, an equilibrium would have to
put positive probability on all three potential mergers. Also, rms 1 and 2 are symmetric, and
so if rm 1 negotiates with rm 2, it obtains 1212 per period in expected value. If instead rm
1 negotiates with rm 3, then its expected payo¤ per period must be u1+ 12 (13   u1   u3) (the
usual Nash split). As usual, mixed strategy equilibrium requires indi¤erence, and for rm 1 to
be indi¤erent,
u1   u3 = 12   13: (4)
This equation plus the two Bellman equations:
u1 =
1 + d
2
1
2
12 +
1  d
2
2; (5)
u3 = d3 + (1  d)

13   1
2
12

; (6)
must be satised in equilibrium, and so dene u1, u3, and d. Indeed, in equilibrium rm 1 is
part of the merger with probability d + 1 d2 =
1+d
2 , and gets the same payo¤,
1
212, whether it
merges with one rm or the other, as we have just argued. With probability 1 d2 , rms 2 and
3 merge, and rm 1s payo¤ is then 2. This is equation (5). Likewise, with probability d rm
3 is left out of the deal, and so its payo¤ will be 3. Otherwise, it will be part of the deal and,
in expected terms, will receive the prots of the merged rm minus the payo¤ of the partner
in case of merger, 1212, as we have just discussed. This is equation (6). This completes the
heuristic argument behind Proposition 1.
We now discuss the behavior of d, the probability of the e¢ cient merger, when (3) fails.
Note that d is always between 13 and 1. If all mergers are equivalent, c12 = c13, then d =
1
3 . In
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the other extreme, if c13   c12 is su¢ ciently large, so that 1212   13 + 3 = 0, then d = 1. In
the interior of this region we obtain the following comparative statics:
Remark If 1212   13 + 3 < 0 (empty core) then d strictly increases with c13 and strictly
decreases with c12.
This result is a direct implication of assumption (A4). Hence, it is important to emphasize
that, even though players use mixed strategies, the comparative statics are very intuitive. In
particular, as c12 falls or c13 increases, rm 30s bargaining position weakens and the likelihood
of an ine¢ cient merger strictly decreases.
2.3 The ex-ante optimal merger policy
Consider rst the case that the policy rule, c, is lower than cn. If we denote by (cij) the change
in consumer surplus that results from a merger with e¢ ciency level cij , (cij) = CS (cij) CS0,
then the expected change in consumer surplus when the approval rule is c, can be written as:
W (c) =
Z c
0
Z c
c12
fd (c12; c13) (c12) + [1  d (c12; c13)] (c13)gh (c12; c13) dc13dc12 +
+
Z c
0
Z c0
c
(c12)h (c12; c13) dc13dc12:
The rst term captures the expected change in consumer surplus when all mergers are acceptable,
c12  c13  c, while the second term captures this e¤ect when the e¢ cient merger is the only
acceptable proposal, c12  c < c13. If all mergers are equivalent and acceptable, c12 = c13  c,
then d = 13 . Since d is a continuous function, as long as c13   c12 is not too large then d < 1.
The e¤ect of a change in c on W can be written as:
dW (c)
dc
=  
Z c
0
[1  d (c12; c)] [ (c12) (c)]h (c12; c) dc12 +
Z c0
c
(c)h (c; c13) dc13: (7)
An increase in c causes two e¤ects on expected consumer surplus. On the one hand, it intensies
the competition between e¢ cient and less e¢ cient mergers; that is, it expands the costs range
where less e¢ cient mergers are also acceptable, causing a discrete fall of the probability of success
of the e¢ cient merger, from 1 to d < 1. This e¤ect is the rst term of (7). Note that for any
value of c > 0 the term is strictly negative: (c12)   (c) is positive for all c12 < c, and for
values of c12 su¢ ciently close to c, d (c12; c) < 1. On the other hand, an increase in c reduces
the possibility that socially desirable mergers are blocked; that is, it expands the area where
the e¢ cient merger is the only acceptable proposal. This is the second term of (7). Note that
as c approaches cn this second term vanishes. Summing up, starting at c = cn a decrease in c
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raises expected consumer surplus, since the reduction in competition between e¢ cient and less
e¢ cient mergers generates a rst order gain, while the exclusion of the e¢ cient merger with an
e¢ ciency level close to cn only causes a second order loss. Therefore, dWdc (c = cn) < 0.
Clearly, a value of c above cn cannot be optimal, since in that range of values both e¤ects
have the same negative sign: an increase in c intensies competition between the e¢ cient and the
ine¢ cient merger and also expands the acceptance of socially undesirable mergers. Summarizing,
Proposition 2 The optimal ex-ante merger policy is more stringent than the ex-post optimal
one; i.e., c < cn.
Thus, an approval rule more stringent than the ex-post optimal rule increases expected
consumer surplus by reducing the probability of a bargaining failure.
3 Ex-ante asymmetric rms
In the baseline model rms are assumed to be ex-ante identical, and hence the interests of
authorities and the industry are perfectly aligned: the rankings of alternative mergers according
to consumer surplus and prots coincided. Nevertheless, the possibility of bargaining failures
calls for approval rules that are more stringent for all mergers than the ex-post optimal policy.
In a model with ex-ante asymmetric rms Nocke and Whinston (2013) have recently shown that
the possibility of a conict of interest between the authorities and the industry also calls for
more stringent approval rules for mergers that include larger rms. In this section we argue that
the two insights are complements, in the sense that more stringent approval rules are socially
benecial in more general setups. However, bargaining failures and the conict of interest
interact in non-trivial ways.
In both this and Nocke and Whinstons papers, the inability of the regulator to select the
e¢ cient merger results in what we can term a selection failure which translates into consumer
surplus losses. When rms are ex-ante symmetric, the only source of selection failure is the
inability of the bargaining parties to maximize industry prots, which can be labeled private
bargaining failures. On the other hand, if rms were ex-ante asymmetric and always selected
the merger that maximizes industry prots, then no private bargaining failure would exist, but
a selection failure would still result from a conict of interest .
To illustrate the interaction of these two sources of selection failures, consider a Cournot
model where rms are ex-ante asymmetric and bargain according to our protocol. We show
that: (1) Asymmetries increase potential losses linked to the selection failure and changes their
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nature; in particular, as rms become ex-ante more asymmetric, the conict of interest between
the industry and authorities becomes more salient, whereas private bargaining failures become
less of a problem. (2) For large asymmetries, private bargaining failures may even attenuate the
negative consequences of the conict of interest. (3) The optimal ex-ante rule is only able to
prevent a fraction of the losses due to the selection failure, but such a fraction increases with
the size of ex-ante asymmetries.
Suppose that demand is linear, p = 1   Q, and that two rms, A and B, have the same
cost advantage prior to any merger opportunity. That is, cA = cB  cC = 0:5, where ci is the
marginal cost of rm i, i = A;B;C. Also, in line with the benchmark model and for simplicity,
assume that mergers between rm C and either rm A or B result in the same level of synergies,
cAC = cBC = ciC , and this can be either higher or lower than the marginal cost of the rm
resulting from a merger between the two large rms, cAB. In the presence of asymmetries
the optimal ex-ante rule can be conditional on the (ex-ante) size of the merging rms. In
particular, authorities announce two thresholds: cAB; ciC : Finally, we need to specify the ex-
ante distribution of (cAB; ciC) : In particular, we assume that with probability , (cAB; ciC)
is a random vector uniformly distributed on the triangle fciC 2 [0; cA] ; cAB  ciCg and with
probability 1  it is uniformly distributed in fciC 2 [0; cA] ; cAB  ciCg. We choose the value of
 so that the ex-ante optimal approval rule is the same for all mergers in the ex-ante symmetric
case, i.e., when cA = cB = cC .12
We have solved this model and obtained that, for all possible mergers, the optimal ex-ante
approval rule is more stringent that the ex-post optimal rule, but much more so for mergers that
involve a higher increase in the (naively computed) Herndhal index. This is what we would
expect from adding to our benchmark model the conict of interest. In Table 1 we report, for
di¤erent values of cA; the losses in consumer surplus associated with selection failures under
alternative selection procedures.13
Table 1: Losses in consumer surplus (%)
12Note that, if we assumed, for instance,  = :5 then, even in the case cA = cB = cC ; the optimal rule would
be characterized by cAB < cAB . The reason is that cAC and cBC are perfectly correlated. As a result, merger
AB challenges the e¢ cient merger more often than AC and BC:
13We stop at cA = 0:35 because for cA  0:325 the optimal approval rule becomes trivial (always forbid the
e¢ cient merger).
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cA Our model Conict of int. Ex-ante vs Ex-post
0:500 6:67 0:00 11:39
0:475 6:24 0:47 17:15
0:450 6:49 2:05 23:88
0:425 7:62 5:05 30:18
0:400 9:75 9:77 35:17
0:375 12:79 16:27 40:27
0:350 16:15 23:84 48:11
In particular, column 1 reports the increase in consumer surplus that would be realized
if the most e¢ cient merger was always implemented (rst best), measured as a percentage
of the increase in consumer surplus when authorities use the ex-post e¢ cient approval rule.14
Notice that these losses rst decrease and then increase with the degree of asymmetry (as cA
decreases). Column 2 reports the losses if instead the merger proposal was always the one that
maximizes industry prots, again measured as a percentage of the increase in consumer surplus
realized when authorities use ex-post e¢ ciency.15 That is, column 2 measures the losses caused
exclusively by the conict of interest, assuming away any private bargaining failures. The losses
attributed to private bargaining failures can be computed by substracting column 2 from column
1. Under symmetry, there is no loss associated to the conict of interest, since private and social
interests are perfectly aligned. However, as cA falls these losses increase at an increasing rate.
Simultaneously, private bargaining failures become less important and a larger share of selection
failures is due to the conict of interest. For values of cA equal or below 0:4 losses generated by
the conict of interest are higher than total selection losses. That is, in expected terms, private
bargaining failures alleviate the negative e¤ects of the conict of interest.16 Indeed, the private
bargaining failure prevents rms from striking the most protable deal with probability one, and
when the conict of interest between consumers and rms is large, this may be in the interest
of consumers.
In column 3 we measure the e¢ cacy of ex-ante optimal rules in reducing selection losses. We
report the percentage of the consumer surplus loss reported in column 1 that is avoided when
the authority uses the ex-ante optimal approval rule.17 These gains in surplus when the approval
14Let CS1 be the expected consumer surplus (ECS) when the e¢ cient merger is always implemented, CS2 be
the ECS when the merger proposal is the outcome of our bargaining game, provided it is CS enhancing (i.e.,
when the ex-post e¢ cient rule is used), CS3 be ECS if no merger is allowed. Then, column 1 of Table 1 reports
CS1 CS2
CS2 CS3  100.
15Let CS4 be ECS if the merger proposal maximizes industry prots and is CS enhancing. Then, column 2 of
Table 1 reports CS1 CS4
CS4 CS3  100.
16The absolute value of these gures is very sensitive to changes in the density function. In this example, we are
assuming that the two possible realizations of synergies are only slightly correlated, and hence with a relatively
high probability the realizations are su¢ ciently di¤erent so that the e¢ cient merger occurs with probability one.
Therefore, these gures would be larger if these two realizations were more positively correlated.
17Let CS5 be the ECS when the merger proposal is the outcome of our bargaining game and satises given the
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rule takes into account selection failures are modest in the case of symmetry, but increase rapidly
as cA falls.
4 More than three rms
The main predictions of the benchmark model do not hinge on the assumption that there are
initially three rms in the market. However, the presence of more than three rms opens the
door to multiple mergers and so adds a dynamic dimension that is absent in the three-rm
case. As an illustration, we now discuss an industry with four ex-ante identical rms and draw
two main lessons that are likely to hold for any number of rms: (i) when only one merger is
feasible then Proposition 1 can be readily extended; (ii) when more than one merger may end
up materizalizing, then merger negotiations are typically characterized by both a conict of
interest, as in Nocke and Whinston (2013), and also by private bargaining failures, as in our
benchmark model.
To facilitate the presentation, consider the Cournot model with linear demand, p = 1   Q.
Assume that only bilateral mergers can generate synergies. A merger between rms i and j
result in costs cij , i; j = 1; :::; 4. However, authorities may still accept two (sequential) merger
proposals if they both generate su¢ cient synergies.
We need modifying the bargaining protocol only in stage 1, to let Nature choose each rm
with probability 14 , and stage 3, to allow rm B to choose either A or any of the other two rms
as negotiation partner. If there is room for two mergers, we may also assume that after the rst
successful merger, the remaining two rms keep bargaining according to the protocol described
in stages (4) to (6) and continue to do so in every period until an agreement is reached.
Suppose that authorities behave myopically and accept any merger proposal that reduces
the price. Let us denote by cnl the marginal cost of the lth merger, l = 1; 2, that leaves the
market price unchanged. In our example cn1 =  1+6c05 and cn2(c
F ) =  1+6c0 c
F
4 ; where c
F is
the marginal cost of the rst approved merger: Note that any merger proposal with a marginal
cost lower than cn1 will also be approved in the second round.
For some realizations of synergies only one merger is feasible.18 Then, (a slightly modied
version of) Proposition 1 readily applies.
The case where multiple mergers are feasible requires more elaboration. Suppose rst that
optimal ex-ante rule. Then, column 3 of Table 1 reports CS5 CS2
CS1 CS2  100.
18For instance, suppose that c12  c13 = c23  cn1 and c14 > cn2(c23), c24 > cn2(c13), c34 > cn2(c12).
Alternatively, consider the case c12  cij  cn1 , for i; j 6= 1; 2, but suppose now that rms incur in a xed cost
of merging. For some range of the xed cost, the market can only support one merger.
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c12  c34  cn1 , and cij 2 [c12; c34] for any other merger ij. Thus, there are two types of rms.
Firms 1 and 2 are of a good type and they together generate the highest level of synergies. Firms
3 and 4 are of a bad type, and their merger generates the lowest level of synergies. A mixed
merger, involving one good and one bad rm, generates an intermediate level of synergies. Note
that, in this example, instead of the three structures in the benchmark model, only two distinct
market structures can emerge: (i) an asymmetric duopoly, where (1; 2) competes against (3; 4)
and obtain 12 and 13 respectively, or (ii) a symmetric duopoly, where the result of two mixed
mergers compete, each obtaining 13, with 13 2 (34; 12). Whether rm 1 merges with rm 3
or 4, and so rm 2 merges with 4 or 3, cannot make a di¤erence in payo¤s for any player. The
consequence is that the core of the game is never empty. As in our benchmark model, this means
that no private bargaining failure will occur: the equilibrium of the bargaining game results in an
asymmetric duopoly if 12+34  213, and in a symmetric one otherwise. However, a conict of
interest between social and private objectives emerges, since the asymmetric duopoly maximizes
consumer surplus if and only if c12 + c34  2c13. If c13 is smaller but close to c12+c342 , then
prots are higher under an asymmetric conguration, since asymmetries reduce the intensity of
competition, but consumer surplus is larger with the symmetric conguration. Therefore, from
a consumer viewpoint, merger proposals are biased towards market congurations that are too
asymmetric.
But the conict of interest is not the only selection problem. Private bargaining failures
may also be an outcome of negotiations. Indeed, assume now that c12  c13 = c23  c14 =
c24  c34  cn1. Three possible market congurations are possible again: (i) a duopoly with a
merger of rms 1 and 2 competing with a merger between rms 3 and 4, (ii) a duopoly with
a merger between rms 1 and 3 competing with a merger between rms 2 and 4, and (iii) a
duopoly where rms 1 and 2 swap positions with respect to (ii). Now, the core may be empty
once again. In particular, this is the case if 12 + 34 2 (13 + 24; 213), and then the prot
maximizing market conguration will not be the equilibrium outcome with probability one.
5 The bargaining protocol
In this section we argue that the main results of the paper are not an artifact of the specic
bargaining protocol we have used, but rather the consequence of more fundamental causes.
However, our modeling choice is not irrelevant, since our protocol has important advantages
over more standard protocols.
Bargaining failures have been overlooked in the literature on endogenous mergers, which
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has either assumed that one of the rms is exogenously selected as target or acquirer (Inderst
and Wey (2004), and Nocke and Whinston (2013)) or, alternatively, ex-post symmetric setups
(all mergers generate the same synergies, like in Fridolfsson and Stenek, 2005a). In both cases,
bargaining failures are absent by construction.
A merger is the result of a process of coalition formation, and the literature on this topic (see,
for instance, Chaterjee et al. (1993), Okada (1996), and Compte and Jehiel (2010))19 has long
established that ine¢ ciencies are likely equilibrium results. Moreover, the existence of these
ine¢ ciencies is very much related to the emptiness of the core of the underlying cooperative
game. For instance, Chaterjee et al. (1993) prove (for strictly superadditive games) that any
e¢ cient, stationary equilibrium (selection) of any rejector proposes protocol20 must converge to
a point in the core. This result immediately implies that ine¢ ciencies have to be part of the
equilibrium for these protocols when the core is empty. Our underlying cooperative game is not
strictly superadditive: the grand coalition cannot form. It is intuitive that this cannot but turn
e¢ ciency even more problematic. The main alternative to this type of protocols are the random
proponent protocols.21 It is a simple exercise to show (details upon request) that in our setting
all rejector proposes protocols as well as all random proponent protocols result in ine¢ ciencies
if the core is empty.22
Our simple protocol shares with those classes of protocols the property that ine¢ cient merg-
ers are part of the equilibrium when the core is empty. However, it has some important ad-
vantages over them: (i) it o¤ers sharp predictions (uniqueness of equilibria), (ii) provides an
intuitive characterization of bargaining failures, and (iii) delivers intuitive comparative statics.
For example, in our setting, a random proponent protocol with equal probabilities (all players
have the same chances of being chosen as proponent) as in Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005a)
would o¤er the same qualitative predictions (details are available upon request).23 However,
such protocol generates multiple equilibria for some range of parameters, and hence an equilib-
rium selection criterion would be needed. Also, the non-emptiness of the core is a necessary,
but not su¢ cient, condition for the e¢ ciency of an equilibrium. Finally, the comparative stat-
19See also Ray (2007) for an excellent overview.
20A proponent makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a subset of active players. If they accept, then the coalition
is irreversibly formed. Otherwise the game moves to the next period, where the rst player that rejected the last
o¤er is the new proponent.
21After each rejection, the new proposer is randomly selected using the same random device.
22The term e¢ ciency here refers to whether the merger that maximizes industry prots is formed.
23Fridolfsson and Stennek assume that all rms are ex-ante identical and all megers materialize the same level
of synergies. In addition, they frame their game in continuous time and bidding rounds occur at random points in
time. However, they also focus on the limit case when the expected di¤erence between two bidding rounds goes
to zero. This is equivalent to the deterministic version we discuss here.
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ics are neither smooth nor intuitive.24 All these drawbacks can be attributed to the rigidities
imbedded in the protocol. In particular, each player has the same chance of becoming the next
proponent, which in a game with discounting grants the weakest player (3) a signicant amount
of bargaining power.25
Our protocol is more exible in the sense that the probability that a particular rm becomes
the proponent is endogenous. As a result, the relative bargaining power of the di¤erent rms
is exclusively given by the fundamentals of the model. As a result equilibrium is uniquely
determined. Moreover, if the core is not empty, rms 1 and 2 are able to avoid rm 3 and the
equilibrium is e¢ cient. If the core is empty rms 1 and 2 cannot ignore rm 3, who is always
able to make a destabilizing o¤er. However, the probability that rm 3 is the proponent is not
exogenous but depends on parameter values. In particular, as the game approaches the region
where the core is not empty, such probability goes to zero.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have made two main points: (a) passive merger policy opens the door to
relatively ine¢ cient mergers because of potential bargaining failures, and (b) a commitment to
a more stringent policy rule may alleviate this ine¢ ciency. We have rst illustrated these ideas
in a stylized model with three ex-ante identical rms. The model encompasses several standard
oligopoly models. We have also showed that ex-ante asymmetries exacerbate the losses from
the bargaining process and so the optimal ex-ante rule is more stringent for all mergers, but
particularly so for those mergers that include larger rms. Finally, we have argued that the
results are likely to hold in the general case where an arbitrary number of rms are involved in
a dynamic merging process.
The working paper version (Burguet and Caminal, 2012) also studies the optimal ex-ante
rule when authorities can use more than one instrument. In particular, relaxing the assumption
that authorities perfectly observe the synergies generated by a merger proposal, we assume that
they have access only to a noisy signal, whose quality depends on the e¤ort exerted by the
partners in the potential merger. That is, authorities allow for an e¢ ciency defense but they
set the information standards that are required to substantiate such e¢ ciency claims. Merger
policy will then consist of two instruments: the minimum quality of the noisy signal and the
24 In particular, in our protocol, when the core is empty, the degree of e¢ ciency, d, increases as c12 falls. This
is a natural result, since a lower c12 should enhance the bargaining power of rms 1 and 2. In contrast, in
Fridolfsson and Stennek d is constant and equal to 2
3
for a full range of values of c12:
25Notice that in any equilibrium without delay the probability of the e¢ cient merger, d; is bounded above by
2
3
:
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threshold of its realization. We show there that bargaining failures still induce authorities to
commit to a lower threshold level of the noisy signal than what is ex-post optimal, but they may
or may not require the signal to be of higher quality.
Two important issues remain to be briey discussed. First, private bargaining failures could
be eliminated (industry prots could be maximized) if rms were allowed to reach agreements
that include monetary transfers between merging and non merging rms. Second, competition
authorities may care not only about the e¤ect of a merger on consumer surplus, but may also
put some weight on industry prots.
One of the crucial characteristics of our bargaining protocol is that only bilateral agreements
are feasible. In our benchmark model whenever a merger involves higher consumer surplus then
it also implies higher industry prots. Thus, bargaining failures are mainly associated with the
inability of the merging partners to compensate the outsider. Alternatively, if rms could agree
on transfers from the merged to non-merged rms then we would expect that the probability
of a relatively ine¢ cient merger would be substantially lower. Obviously, allowing for transfer
payments among rms is a highly controversial policy prescription, as it could be used to imple-
ment collusive arrangements. Moreover, when ex-ante asymmetries are su¢ ciently large, then
we showed that private bargaining failures alleviate the ine¢ ciencies associated with the conict
of interest. Hence, allowing side payments between merging and non-merging rms would reduce
consumer surplus. Finally, the use of transfer payments may also be counterproductive if there
exists the possibility of preemptive mergers (rms are willing to participate in a prot-reducing
merger in order to avoid a worst situation: being left out of the deal). In this case, since a merger
lowers aggregate prots but raises consumer surplus, if and when transfer payments are allowed
then rms may be able to reach an overall agreement that eliminates the merger equilibrium.26
Extending the analysis to the case when competition authorities maximize a weighted average
of consumer surplus and prots involves considering mergers that are protable but unattractive,
in the sense that rms prefer not to participate and be left out of the merger. Fridolfsson
and Stennek (2005a and 2005b) show that the bargaining game is a war of attrition in such
case, and when all mergers are symmetric there are multiple equilibria. In particular, there
is an equilibrium where a merger takes place later in the game (delay). In our model with
asymmetric mergers it can be shown that for some parameter values there is still a probability
that the relatively ine¢ cient merger succeeds. Hence the identity of merging rms is an issue
26Fridolfsson and Steneck (2005b) have noticed that divestiture clauses in merger proposals can actually be
equivalent to transfer payments between merged and non-merged rms. They have shown that when mergers
are protable but unattractive rms play a war of attrition. Whether or not divestiture clauses may help in
implementing the aggregate prot maximizing outcome in alternative scenarios remains an open question.
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also in this scenario. Consequently, the main insight of our paper seems to extend quite directly
to the case where authorities have a more general objective function.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Market models
We show that both the Cournot model and a di¤erentiated product model in the spirit of Dixit
(1979), t the reduced form model of Section 2 under appropriate parameter restrictions.
First, we analyze the di¤erentiated product model with utility function (1). We restrict
attention to parameter values that imply cn > 0. Thus, we let (3 + 2)c0 >  if competition
is in quantities, and (   ) < ( + )(2   )c0 if competition is in prices. Also, in order to
simplify the discussion we will only consider cases where qk > 0. This requires that  > (+)c0
if competition is in quantities and (   ) > (   2+ )c0,27 if competition is in prices.
The inverse demand function for each good is
pi =
@U(q; x)
@qi
=   qi   
X
j 6=i
qj ; (8)
where pi is the price of variety i in terms of the numeraire. Thus, the consumer surplus as a
function of (q; x) can be written as
dCS(q; x) = U(q; x)  3X
i=1
piqi = x+
   
2
3X
i=1
q2i +

2
(
3X
i=1
qi)
2:
27 In price competition, if the intercept of the demand for rm k is below c0, then the equilibrium price for rm
k is c0.
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Quantity competition: In the triopoly game each rm solves
max
qi
0@  c0   qi   X
j 6=i
qj
1A qi;
and so rm is reaction function is
qi = R0(q i) =
  c0   
P
j 6=iQj
2
: (9)
Then the symmetric equilibrium output of each rm, q0, is
q0 =
  c0
2( + )
: (10)
Assume rms i and j merge and the cost of each variety is cij . Firm ks reaction function is
still (9). For the merged rm the rst order condition that determines qi is now
  cij   2qi   2qj   qk = 0; (11)
and similarly for qj . In equilibrium, qi = qj . Thus, let qij(cij) denote this common quantity of
varieties i and j, and qk(cij) denote the equilibrium quantity for rm k. These values are
qij(cij) =
2 (  cij)  (  c0)
4( + )  22 ; (12)
qk(cij) =
2( + )(  c0)  2 (  cij)
4( + )  22 :
We let cn be the value of cij that satises qij(cij) = q0, where q0 is dened in (10). We will see
below that this value is well dened and smaller than c0. Since the reaction function of rm k
has not changed, then also qk(cn) = q0. Finally, CS(cn) = CS0.
Price competition: Assume now that rms set prices. We still have that the inverse
demand system is given by (8). Inverting that system, we obtain the demand system,
qi =
1
D
[(   )  ( + )pi + (pj + pk)] ;
where D = (   )( + 2). We write this as
qi =
1
D
[A Bpi +G(pj + pk)] ;
where A = (   ), B = ( + ) and G = . The rst order condition for prot maximization
by rm i is
A+Bc0   2Bpi +G(pj + pk) = 0: (13)
Solving this system we obtain the pre-merger equilibrium prices as
p0 =
A+Bc0
2(B  G) :
Assume rms i and j merge. Firm ks rst order condition is still (13), whereas for the merged
rm in its variety i the rst order condition is
A+ (B  G)cij   (2B  G)pi +G(pj + pk) = 0:
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Solving this system for pi = pj , we obtain
pij =
A(G+ 2B) + 2B(B  G)cij +BGc0
4B(B  G)  2G2 ;
pk =
AB +B(B  G)c0 +G(B  G)cij
2B(B  G) G2 :
The quantities are
qij =
1
D
[A  (B  G)pij +Gpk] ;
qk =
1
D
[A  2Bpk + 2Gpij ] :
Let cn be such that pk(cn) = p0. Note again that pij(cn) = p0. Indeed, the reaction function
of rm k has not changed, so that any other prices by the merged rms would imply a di¤erent
price by rm k.
Lemma 1.Whether rms compete in quantities or prices, assumptions (A.1) through (A.4)
are satised.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the online appendix.
We now analyze the Cournot model under. In particular, assume p(Q) is twice continuously
di¤erentiable, and for all Q such that p(Q) > 0, satisfy (i) p0 (Q) < 0; (ii) p0(Q) + p00 (Q)Q < 0,
and (iii) limQ!1 p (Q) = 0. Condition (ii) implies that individual prot functions are strictly
concave. The rst order condition for rm is prot maximization problem, whether in duopoly
or triopoly, is
p0 (Q)Qi + p (Q)  ci = 0: (14)
Also, condition (ii) plus constant marginal costs imply that the reaction function of a rm
is decreasing in the output of rival rms with slope greater than  1. Finally, in the duopoly
game, a higher value of cij results in lower qij ; and hence higher qk and lower aggregate output
Q. (See, for instance, Proposition 2.4 in Corchón, 1996.) Thus, CS is decreasing in cij .
Lemma 2.Under conditions (i), (ii), and (iii), the Cournot model satises (A.1) through
(A.4) if cn > 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 is also in the online appendix.
If cn  0, then there is no merger that can result in an increase in consumer surplus, so that
the problem is not interesting. If the condition
p0 (3q0) 2q0 + p (3q0) > 0 (15)
holds then in the duopoly game a merged rm with marginal costs cij = 0 will choose a level
of output higher than 2q0, which implies that aggregate output will be higher than premerger
output 3q0. Therefore, by the monotonicity of CS (cij), cn > 0. It can be shown that condition
(15) is equivalent to the elasticity of demand at 3q0 being higher than 23 . A su¢ cient assumption
involving only the primitives that implies (15) is that p (0)  c0 is positive but su¢ ciently small.
Under these assumptions, the Cournot model results in prots and consumer surplus that t
our reduced form model.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We provide a proof of Proposition 1 by investigating a set of properties that any equilibrium
would have to satisfy. These properties impose restrictions on the equilibrium outcomes which,
as r approaches 0, identies a unique outcome. Finally, we nd equilibrium strategies that result
in such outcome. Before turning to the formal details, we o¤er an intuitive description of these
properties. First, some merger must be strictly better for the rms involved than passing on the
opportunity to merge. Moreover, it cannot be the case that this is so for exactly two of the three
mergers. That would leave the rm not involved in the third merger with too much leverage,
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so that it should expect a payo¤ as large as the total surplus of at least one of its two possible
mergers, which is a contradiction. Now, in terms of rmspreferences for merging partner, there
could be no cycles, where every rm prefers (some strictly so) to merge with another rm that
itself prefers to merge with the third one. This would basically preclude agreements. So either
all rms are indi¤erent as to the choice of merger partner, or there is a pair of rms who strictly
prefer merging with each other. In the latter case, these rms must be rms 1 and 2 and, since
nothing prevents these rms to negotiate (in our protocol), they would merge with probability
1. But then rms 1 and 2 would be in a symmetric position vis a vis each other, and so they
must expect the same payo¤. These properties dene the two possible types of equilibria: one
where rms 1 and 2 merge with probability 1 and share equally the surplus of their merger, and
one where everyone is indi¤erent as to the choice of merger partner. The latter can only happen
when asymmetries (expost) are not large, and the opposite holds for the former.
We now turn to the formal proof. A strategy for rm i consists of

ji ; 
j
i ; 
k
i

for the selection
of negotiating partners and

ji ; 
j
i ; 
k
i ; 
k
i

for the actual negotiation phase. ji is the probability
that rm i invites rm j to be its negotiation partner in node (2), if i is chosen by nature in
node (1). Given the denition of the game, the probability that i proposes k is ki = 1  ji .
ji is the probability that rm i accepts rm js invitation to become a negotiation partner in
node (3), and ki is the probability that i accepts rm ks invitation. In line with the restriction
to stationary strategies, we will assume that ji = 1   ki . That is, if invited in step (2), rm i
chooses its partner for the negotiation phase independently of who gave it that possibility, rm
k or rm j. Therefore, in case nature chooses rm i, the probability that rms (i; j) negotiate
in nodes (5) and (6) is ji
i
j , the probability that (i; k) negotiate is 
k
i 
i
k =

1  ji

ik, and the
probability that (j; k) negotiate is ji
k
j + 
k
i 
j
k = 
j
i
 
1  ij

+

1  ji
  
1  ik

. Also, ji is
the (per period) o¤er that rm i makes to rm j with probability ji in node (5) if the former
is chosen by nature in node (4) as the proponent. ki and 
k
i are the corresponding values in a
negotiation with k. In order to avoid open-set technical problems, and also to save in notation,
we assume that in node (6) the respondent accepts with probability one any o¤er above or equal
to the value of continuation. That is why we do not include these decisions in the denition of
a strategy. As we will see in the analysis below, this is innocuous and in particular does not
rule out the possibility of delay in case of indi¤erence.28 Then, in any equilibrium ji =
r0+uj
1+r
whenever ij >
ui+uj+2r0
1+r ( and we can also restrict to such o¤er when ij =
ui+uj+2r0
1+r and
ji > 0).
Again, note that in line with the restriction to stationary strategies, we are implicitly as-
suming that the answer to invitations to negotiate in node (3) and the o¤er in node (5) do not
depend on who made the invitation to negotiate or who answered to that invitation, but only
on the identity of the partner.
Let us denote uiji the equilibrium per-period payo¤ that rm i expects in step (4) before
nature chooses who will make an o¤er, and given that rms (i:j) will be negotiating. That is, in
any node of the extensive form game reached immediately after i has chosen j as the negotiation
partner, or j has chosen i. Finally, let us dij denote the probability that merger (i; j) succeeds.
We derive several properties of any equilibrium outcome.
28 Indeed, apart from open-set issues, in a SPE there could be indi¤erence between accepting and rejecting a
partners o¤er only if the sum of the continuation values for both partners is equal to what they have to share. In
ths case, the fact that the proponent can choose any value  in [0; 1] already allows for any probability of delay.
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8.2.1 Property 1: There is a positive surplus in at least one negotiation (i; j):
ij >
ui+uj+2r0
1+r .
Suppose not; i.e., for all (i; j)
ij  ui + uj + 2r0
1 + r
; (16)
which implies that whenever rm i is one of the negotiation partners it gets ui+r01+r , whether the
merger materializes or not. Then, 8i, ui  djki + (1  djk)max
n
0;
ui+r0
1+r
o
. Hence, ui  0.
Therefore, ui+uj+2r01+r  20 < ij . We have reached a contradiction.
8.2.2 Property 2: It cannot be the case that there is a strictly positive surplus in
exactly two negotiations .
Suppose that in two and only two negotiations there is a strictly positive surplus, i.e.,
ui + uj + 2r0
1 + r
 ij ;
ui + uk + 2r0
1 + r
< ik;
uj + uk + 2r0
1 + r
< jk:
These inequalities imply that:
uk + r0 <
1 + r
2
(ik + jk   ij) : (17)
Since uiki >
ui+r0
1+r = u
ij
i then 
k
i = (
k
i =) 1. Similarly, 
k
j = 1. As a result, dij = 0 and
dik + djk = 1. Hence, we can write:
ui = dik
1
2

ik +
ui   uk
1 + r

+ (1  dik)i;
uj = dikj + (1  dik) 1
2

jk +
uj   uk
1 + r

;
uk = dik
1
2

ik +
uk   ui
1 + r

+ (1  dik) 1
2

jk +
uk   uj
1 + r

:
For any dik 2 [0; 1], the solution of this system for uk plus r0 is larger than the right hand side
of (17). We have reached a contradiction.
8.2.3 Property 3: If rm i strictly prefers to negotiate with rm j and viceversa,
then i = 1 and j = 2.
Consider rst the case where there is only one negotiation with a strictly positive surplus. Then
we show that it has to be the negotiation between rms i and j: Indeed, if ij >
ui+uj+2r0
1+r ,
then
uiji =
1
2

ij +
ui + r0
1 + r
  uj + r0
1 + r

>
ui + r0
1 + r
;
whereas uiki =
ui+r0
1+r . The same applies to j, so that in equilibrium 
j
i = 
i
j = 1. Also, this
implies that ji = 
i
j = 1, and then ui = uj =
1
2ij , and uk = k Thus, if ij  ik, we have that
ij >
ui+uj+2r0
1+r and ik  ui+uk+2r01+r implies uj = 12ij < uk = k, which is a contradiction.
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Alternatively, if all three negotiations involve a strictly positive surplus, then suppose that
(i; j) = (1; 3). That is,
u131 > u
12
1 ;
u133 > u
23
3 :
These inequalities imply that 13 = 
3
1 = (
3
1 = 
1
3 =)1, and then also 
1
3 = 
3
1 = 1. Thus,
u1 = u3 =
1
213, and u2 = 2. Then
u121 =
1
2
 
12 +
1
213 + r0
1 + r
  2 + r0
1 + r
!
>
1
2
 
13 +
1
213 + r0
1 + r
 
1
213 + r0
1 + r
!
= u131 ;
which is a contradiction. A similar contradiction would obtain if we assumed that (i; j) = (2; 3).
8.2.4 Property 4: Preference cycles cannot occur: If i weakly prefers to negotiate
with j, j weakly prefers to negotiate with k; and k weakly prefers to negotiate
with i, then they all must be indi¤erent.
Suppose not. If there is a strictly positive surplus in all three negotiations, so that all end up in
agreement, then ui + uj + 2r0  (1 + r)ij , for all i; j, and then
ij   uj + r0
1 + r
 ik   uk + r0
1 + r
; (18)
jk   uk + r0
1 + r
 ij   ui + r0
1 + r
; (19)
ik   ui + r0
1 + r
 jk   uj + r0
1 + r
: (20)
If we add up these three inequalities then this can only be satised if the three hold with equality.
Alternatively, if there is strictly positive surplus only in the negotiation between rms 1 and 2,
i.e., u1+u2+2r0 < (1 + r)12, and for the rest of the pairs the inequality is (weakly) reversed,
then u232 =
u2+r0
1+r . Assume that 1 prefers to negotiate with 2. For 2 to prefer negotiations with
3, it should hold that u232 =
u2+r0
1+r  12  u1+r01+r , which contradicts u1+u2+2r0 < (1 + r)12.
Similarly if 2 prefers negotiating with 1, and 1 prefers negotiating with 3.
8.2.5 Property 5: If rm 1 strictly prefers to negotiate with rm 2, and viceversa,
then d12 = 1.
If u121 > u
13
1 then 
2
1 = 1. Similarly, if u
12
2 > u
23
2 then 
1
2 = 1. Since u
13
1  u1+r01+r and u232 
u2+r0
1+r , then 12 = u
12
1 + u
12
2 >
u1+u2+2r0
1+r . That is, 
2
1 = 
1
2 = 1. Then, 
2
1 = 
1
2 = 1. Indeed, if
3i > 0, i = 1; 2, then is payo¤ will be either u
i3
i (if 3 accepts the invitation),
ui+r0
1+r (if 3 refuses
but no agreement ensues) or 2 (if 3 refuses and then agrees with j). Since u12i > u
i3
i  ui+r01+r ,
a deviation to 3i = 0 is protable unless u
12
i = 2 (< 0). But
ui+r0
1+r < u
12
i = 2 implies
ui < 2, and a strategy of refusing any deal would be a protable deviation. This contradition
shows tha d12 = 1.
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8.2.6 Property 6: Firms 1 and 2 obtain the same expected payo¤
If the negotiation between 1 and 2 is the only one that generates a strictly positive surplus, then
from Property 5, d12 = 1, which indeed implies u1 = u2 = 1212. Suppose now that all three
negotiations generate a strictly positive surplus, and u1 > u2. In this case rm 3 strictly prefers
to negotiate with rm 2 rather than rm 1, since
ui33 =
1
2

i3 +
u3 + r0
1 + r
  ui + r0
1 + r

;
and so u233 > u
13
3 . Then from Property 3, u
23
2  u122 , and so from Property 4 u121 > u131 . But
u121 > u
13
1 implies that 
2
1 = 1, and u
23
3 > u
13
3 implies that 
2
3 = 1. Hence, d13 = 0 and so
d12 + d23 = 1. Thus,
u1 = d12u
12
1 + d232  u121 ; (21)
u2 = d12u
12
2 + d23u
23
3 : (22)
If u232 < u
12
2 then from Property 5, d12 = 1, and equations (21) and (22) imply that u1 = u2. If
u232 = u
12
2 then u2 = u
12
2 , which together with inequality 21 contradicts that u1 > u2.
8.2.7 Property 7: There are two possible types of equilibria: (I) u121 > u
13
1 and
u122 > u
23
2 , (II) u
ij
i = u
ik
i for all i; j; k.
Since u1 = u2 (Property 6), and since either none or both negotiations of 3 with 1 and 2 have
strictly positive surplus, then u233 = u
13
3 . Thus, both the case where u
12
2  u232 and u121  u131 ,
and the case where u122  u232 and u121  u131 , would violate Property 4 unless all inequalities hold
with equality. Thus, besides the case where all rms are indi¤erent, there are two other cases
to consider: (a) u122 < u
23
2 , u
12
1 < u
13
1 and (b) u
12
2 > u
23
2 , u
12
1 > u
13
1 . Case (a) cannot be part of
an equilibrium. Indeed, in case (a) 21 = 
1
2 = 0, which implies d12 = 0, and 13 >
u1+u3+2r0
1+r
and 23 > u2+u3+2r01+r . Therefore, d13 + d23 = 1, and so:
u1 = d13
1
2

13   u3   u1
1 + r

+ d232;
u2 = d132 + d23
1
2

13   u3   u2
1 + r

;
u3 =
1
2

13   u1   u3
1 + r

:
Since u1 = u2 then d13 = d23, and solving the above system we obtain u3 =
(1+2r)13 2
1+4r >
13
2 .
As a result u131 <
13
2 <
12
2 = u
12
1 , and we reach a contradiction in case (a).
We can now proceed to characterize the two types of equilibria.
8.2.8 Equilibrium type I
Consider an equilibrium with u121 > u
13
1 and u
12
2 > u
23
2 . From Property 4, d12 = 1. For instance,
21 = 
1
2 = 
2
1 = 
1
2 = 
2
1 = 
1
2 = 1. Hence
u1 = u2 =
1
2
12;
u3 = 3:
Thus, a protable deviation for either rm 1 or rm 2 exists if and only if 1212 <
1
2

13   31+r + 12(1+r)12

.
Indeed, the right hand side of the inequality is player is expected payo¤, i = 1; 2, when invited
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in step (2) if 3i = 1, whereas the left hand side is what she expects in that situation when
3i = 0. Therefore, d12 = 1 is an equilibrium if and only if:
1
2
+ r

12   (1 + r)13 + 3  0:
8.2.9 Equilibrium type II
Consider an equilibrium with uiji = u
ik
i for all i; j; k. If u
ij
i = u
ik
i =
ui+r0
1+r , that implies
uijj =
uj+r0
1+r and u
ik
k =
uk+r0
1+r . Then, since u
ik
k = u
jk
k and u
ij
j = u
jk
j , we reach a contradiction
with Property 1. Thus, uiji = u
ik
i >
ui+r0
1+r , so that by Property 2 there is positive surplus in all
negotiations. Thus, all three negotiations would end in agreement. Thus, d12 + d13 + d23 = 1
and
u1 = (d12 + d13)
1
2
12 + d232;
u2 = (d12 + d23)
1
2
12 + d132;
u3 = d123 + (d13 + d23)

13   1
2
12

:
Since u1 = u2 then d13 = d23. If we let d12 = d, and hence d13 = d23 = 1 d2 , and since
12   u3 + r0
1 + r
= 13   u1 + r0
1 + r
; (23)
we can solve this system to obtain
d =
12   22 + 4r (12   13)
 12 + 413   22   43 :
The numerator is positive, and so (13 ) d < 1 if and only if the denominator is larger than
the numerator. That is, if
 
1
2 + r

12   (1 + r)13 + 3 < 0. One such equilibrium would be
ji =
1
2 ,for all i; j, and 
2
1 = 
1
2 =
3d 1
2 and 
1
3 =
1
2 . Finally, if
 
1
2 + r

12  (1 + r)13+ 3  0
then for r su¢ ciently small u1+u3+201+r >
1
213, and rms 1 and 2 cannot be indi¤erent between
negotiating with each other or with rm 3.
Summarizing, for any r su¢ ciently close to 0 the equilibrium exists and the equilibrium
outcome is unique. Q.E.D.
30
ONLINE APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Before proceeding, note that, for the price competition case
dqij
dcij
=
2(B  G)
D (4B(B  G)  2G2)
  (B  G)B +G2 < 0;
since (B  G) =  >  = G and B =  +  > G. Likewise,
dqk
dcij
=
2G(B  G)B
D (4B(B  G)  2G2) > 0:
Moreover,
2
dqij
dcij
+
dqk
dcij
< 0;
since 2
  (B  G)B +G2 + GB =  2B2 + 3GB + 2G2 =  2( + )2 + 3( + ) + 22
=  22    + 32, which is negative. Thus an increase in cij reduces the total quantity sold
in the market, adding up all varieties.
We now show that all assumptions (A.1) through (A.4) are satised, both with price and
quantity competition.
(A.4): ij + 2k is decreasing in cij :
Assume quantity competition. Then, using the rst order conditions of the rmsmaximiza-
tion problems,
d(ij + k)
dcij
=  2qij + 2@qij
@cij
@pk
@qij
qk + 2
@qk
@cij
@pij
@qk
qij
=  2qij + 22
D
qk   22
D
qij ;
where D = 4( + )  22. Thus, the sign is the same as the sign of
 2( + )qij + qk < 0:
Alternatively, assume price competition. Then, taking into account the rst order conditions of
rmsmaximization problems for price competition,
d(ij + 2k)
dcij
=  2qij + 2@qij
@pk
@pk
@cij
(pij   cij) + 2 @qk
@pij
@pij
@cij
(pk   c0)
=  2qij + 2G
D

@pk
@cij
(pij   cij) + 2@pij
@cij
(pk   c0)

=
 2 1
D
[A  (B  G)pij +Gpk] + 2G
D

@pk
@cij
(pij   cij) + 2@pij
@cij
(pk   c0)

:
The second square bracket is positive. For interior solutions qk > 0, so that A 2Bpk+2Gpij > 0,
and then the rst square bracket is larger than (2B+G)pk (G+B)pij . Note that @pk@cij ;
@pij
@cij
< 1,
(pk   c0) < pk and (pij   cij) < pij . Thus, the expression is smaller than 2 1D times
  [(2B +G)pk   (G+B)pij ] +G [pij + 2pk]
= (G  2B) pk + (2G+B)pij
=  (2 + )pk + (3 + )pij < 0;
where the last inequality follows from  > 2 and the fact that, since @pk@cij <
@pij
@cij
, then for
cij < cn, pk > pij .
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(A.2) and (A.3): dijdcij < 0 and
dk
dcij
> 0:
Under quantity competition the proof is trivial, since qk is increasing in cij and qij is de-
creasing in cij . Also, for price competition
dk (cij)
dcij
=
@qk
@pij
@pk
@cij
(pk   ck) > 0;
and that, together with the previous lemma, proves that dijdcij < 0.
Note that, if cn is well dened, then ij (cn) = (p0   cn) 2q0 > 2 (p0   c0) q0 = 20, and
k (cn) = (p0   c0) q0 = 0. Thus, (A.2) indeed follows from the lemma when cn is well dened.
We now turn to (A.1).
(A.1): CS(cij) is a di¤erentiable, decreasing function of cij for cij < c0, and so cn is well
dened, where CS(cn) = CS0:
Assume quantity competition. Note that by (12) dqij(cij)dcij < 0. Thus an increase in cij
will induce a reduction in qij(cij). Then it su¢ ces to show that dCS((qij ; qij ; R0(qij)) ; x) is
di¤erentiable and increasing in qij for the relevant domain, cij  c0. And indeed,
dCS((qij ; qij ; R0(qij)) ; x)
dqij
= (24)
(   )(2qij +R00qk) + (2 +R00)(2qij + qk);
where R00 is the slope of the reaction function of rm k. The second term is positive, since
R00 >  1. Also, for cij = c0
2qij +R
0
0qk = (  c0)
2(2   ) + 2(   )R00
4( + )  22 ;
and since R00 >  1, this is positive. Finally, 2qij + R00qk is decreasing in cij since dqij(cij)dcij < 0
and dqk(cij)dcij > 0. Thus, for cij < c0 the expression is also positive, and we conclude that (24) is
positive for all cij  c0, which proves the result.
Consider now price competition. Recall thatdCS(q(cij); x) = x+  2 P3i=1 q2i + 2 (P3i=1 qi)2.
We have already shown that
P3
i=1 qi is decreasing in cij . Now,
d
P3
i=1 q
2
i
dcij
= (4qij
@qij
@cij
+ 2qk
@qk
@cij
):
For cij  cn, qij > qk so that since 2dqijdcij +
dqk
dcij
< 0, this term is negative. Now, for all cij > cn,
we have qk > qij . Also, we can write dCS(q(cij); x) = 2 (P3i=1 qi)2   2 (2q2ij + 4qijqk). Note
that
d(2q2ij + 4qijqk)
dcij
= 4(qij + qk)
@qij
@cij
+ 4qij
@qk
@cij
> 4(qij + qk)
@qij
@cij
+ 4
qij + qk
2
@qk
@cij
= 2(qij + qk)

2
@qij
@cij
+
@qk
@cij

;
where we have used the fact that qk > qij in the inequality. Moreover, note that
d
dcij
(
3X
i=1
qi)
2 = 2(2qij + qk)

2
@qij
@cij
+
@qk
@cij

:
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Therefore,
dCS
dcij
=

2
d
dcij
(
3X
i=1
qi)
2      
2
d(2q2ij + 4qijqk)
dcij
<

2
d
dcij
(
3X
i=1
qi)
2 +
   
2
2qij

2
@qij
@cij
+
@qk
@cij

< 0;
since 2@qij@cij +
@qk
@cij
< 0. QED
Proof of Lemma 2
Equilibrium output, consumer surplus and prots are continuously di¤erentiable, since de-
mand is continuously di¤erentiable. At a cost cij = c0, the left hand side of (14) evaluated at
Q = 3q0 and Qij = 2q0 (> q0) is negative, since p0 < 0. Thus, at that cost qij < 2q0, and so
Q < 3q0. Therefore, CS(c0) < CS0 and cn < c0. Assumption (A.1) holds.
Since qij is decreasing in cij , and qk is increasing in qij , then ij (cij) is decreasing in cij . At
cost cn, qij = 2qk = 2q0, and since cn < c0, ij (cn) > 20. Assumption (A.2) holds.
Similarly, k (cij) is increasing in cij , and k (cn) = 0. Assumption (A.3) holds.
Next, rst order condition (14) for the merged rm (i; j) can be written as:
p  cij =  p0 (Q) qij :
Note that d(p cij)dcij =  p00 (Q) qij
dQ
dcij
  p0 (Q) dqijdcij . If p00 (Q) < 0, the right hand side is negative,
since both dQdcij and
dqij
dcij
are negative. Otherwise,
d (p  cij)
dcij
=   p00 (Q) qij + p0 (Q) dqij
dcij
  p00 (Q) qij dqk
dcij
<   p00 (Q)Q+ p0 (Q) dqij
dcij
  p00 (Q) qij dqk
dcij
< 0;
since the square bracket is negative and dqkdcij > 0. Thus, we conclude that
dp
dcij
< 1. Finally,
using the envelop theorem,
dij
dcij
+ 2
dk
dcij
= qij

 1 + p0 (Q) dqk
dcij
+ 2p0 (Q)
qk
qij
dqij
dcij

 qij

 1 + p0 (Q)

dqk
dcij
+
dqij
dcij

= qij

 1 + dp
dcij

< 0;
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that, for cij < cn,
qk
qij
 12 . Therefore, we conclude
that Assumption (A.4) holds. QED
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